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Characterizing the physical channel and calibrating the cryptosystem hardware are prerequisites
for establishing a quantum channel for quantum key distribution (QKD). Moreover, an inappro-
priately implemented calibration routine can open a fatal security loophole. We propose and ex-
perimentally demonstrate a method to induce a large temporal detector efficiency mismatch in a
commercial QKD system by deceiving a channel length calibration routine. We then devise an
optimal and realistic strategy using faked states to break the security of the cryptosystem. A fix for
this loophole is also suggested.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Ac, 42.50.Ex
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers uncondition-
ally secure communication as eavesdropping disturbs the
transmitted quantum states, which in principle leads to
the discovery of the eavesdropper Eve [1]. However,
practical QKD implementations may suffer from techno-
logical and protocol-operational imperfections that Eve
could exploit in order to remain concealed [2, 3].
Until now, a variety of eavesdropping strategies have
utilized differences between the theoretical model and the
practical implementation, arising from (technical) im-
perfections or deficiencies of the components. Ranging
from photon number splitting and Trojan-horse, to leak-
age of information in a side channel, time-shifting and
phase-remapping, several attacks have been proposed
and experimentally demonstrated [4–8]. Recently, proof-
of-principle attacks [9–11] based on the concept of faked
states [12] have been presented. Eve targets imperfec-
tions of avalanche photodiode (APD) based single-photon
detectors [13] that allow her to control them remotely.
Another important aspect of QKD security not yet in-
vestigated, however, is the calibration of the devices. A
QKD protocol requires a classical and a quantum chan-
nel; while the former must be authenticated, the latter
is merely required to preserve certain properties of the
quantum signals [2, 14]. The establishment of the quan-
tum channel remains an implicit assumption in security
proofs: channel characterization (e.g. channel length)
and calibration of the cryptosystem hardware, especially
the steps involving two-party communication, haven’t yet
been taken into account. As we show, the calibration of
the QKD devices must be carefully implemented, other-
wise it is prone to hacks that may strengthen existing, or
create new eavesdropping opportunities for Eve.
In this Letter, we propose and experimentally demon-
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FIG. 1. Typical detection system in a Mach-Zehnder interfer-
ometer based QKD implementation: The bit and basis choices
of Alice and Bob (phases ϕAlice and ϕBob) determine the inter-
ference result at the 50:50 beam splitter (BS), or which of the
two detectors D0 or D1 would click. It is thus crucial that D0
and D1 are indistinguishable to the outside world (i.e. Eve).
If gated mode APDs are employed, the detector control board
ensures that the activation of D0 and D1 (via voltage pulses
V0(t) and V1(t)) happens almost simultaneously, to nullify any
existing temporal efficiency mismatch.
strate the hacking of a vital calibration sequence during
the establishment of the quantum channel in the com-
mercial QKD system Clavis2 from ID Quantique [15].
Eve induces a parameter mismatch [16] between the de-
tectors that can break the security of the QKD system.
Specifically, she causes a temporal separation of the or-
der of 450 ps of the detection efficiencies by deceiving
the detection system, shown in Fig. 1. This allows her
to control Bob’s detection outcomes using time, a pa-
rameter already shown to be instrumental in applying
a time-shift attack (TSA) [7]. Alternatively, she could
launch a faked-state attack (FSA) [16] for which we cal-
culate the quantum bit error rate (QBER) under realistic
conditions. Since FSA is an intercept-resend attack, Eve
has full information-theoretic knowledge about the key
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FIG. 2. Manipulation of the calibration routine: (a) Sim-
plified version of Alice and Bob devices and Eve (in italic)
gearing for the hack. FM: Faraday mirror, CD: classical pho-
todiode, DLs: delay loops, VOA: variable optical attenuator,
CR: coupler, BS: 50:50 beam splitter, PBS: polarizing beam
splitter, C: optical circulator. The hexagonal-shaped objects
are phase modulators (PMs); ϕX, where X is Bob, Alice or
Eve, represents the applied modulation. (b) Timeline for a
cycle of the hacked LLM. Vpi: PM voltage for a pi phase shift.
as long as Alice and Bob accept the QBER at the given
channel transmission T , and do not abort key genera-
tion [17]. Constricting our FSA to match the raw key
rate expected by Bob and Alice, i.e. maintaining T at
nearly the exact pre-attack level, we find that the secu-
rity of the system is fully compromised. Our hack has
wide implications: most practical QKD schemes based
on gated APDs, in both plug-and-play and one-way con-
figurations [19–21], need to perform channel characteri-
zation and hardware calibration regularly. A careful im-
plementation of these steps is required to avoid leaving
inadvertent backdoors for Eve.
The optical setup of Clavis2 is based on the plug-
and-play QKD scheme [15, 19]. An asymmetric Mach-
Zehnder interferometer operates in a double pass over the
quantum channel by using a Faraday mirror; see Fig. 2(a)
without Eve. The interference of the paths taken by two
pulses travelling from Bob to Alice and back is deter-
mined by their relative phase modulation (ϕBob−ϕAlice),
and forms the principle for encoding the key. Any bire-
fringence effects of the quantum channel are passively
compensated. As a prerequisite to the key exchange,
Clavis2 calibrates its detectors in time via a sequence
named Line Length Measurement (LLM). Bob emits a
pair of bright pulses and applies a series of detector gates
around an initial estimate of their return. The timing
of the gates is electronically scanned (while monitoring
detector clicks) to refine the estimation of the channel
length and relative delay between the time of arrival of
the pulses at D0 and D1. Alice keeps her phase mod-
ulator (PM) switched off, while Bob applies a uniform
phase of pi/2 to one of the incoming pulses. Therefore,
both detectors are equally illuminated and their detection
efficiencies, denoted by η0(t) and η1(t), can be resolved
in time. Any existing mismatch can thus be minimized
by changing the gate-activation times (see Fig. 1).
However, the calibration routine does not always suc-
ceed; as reported in [7], a high detector efficiency mis-
match (DEM) is sometimes observed after a normal run
of LLM. For example, we have noticed a temporal mis-
match as high as 400 ps in Clavis2. This physical limita-
tion of the system – arising due to fast and uncontrollable
fluctuations in the quantum channel or electromagnetic
interference in the detection circuits – is the vulnerabil-
ity that the TSA exploits. However, the attack has some
limitations: it is applicable only when the temporal mis-
match happens to exceed a certain threshold value, which
is merely 4% of all the instances [7]. Also, Eve can nei-
ther control the mismatch (as it occurs probabilistically),
nor extract its value (as it is not revealed publicly).
We exploit a weakness of the calibration routine to
induce a large and deterministic DEM without needing
to extract any information from Bob. As depicted in
Fig. 2(a), Eve installs her equipment in the quantum
channel such that the laser pulse pair coming out of Bob’s
short and long arm passes through her PM. Eve’s modu-
lation pattern is such that a rising edge in the PM volt-
age flips the phase in the second (long arm) optical pulse
from −pi/2 to pi/2, as shown in Fig. 2(b). As a result of
this hack, when the pulse pair interferes at Bob’s 50:50
beam splitter, the two temporal halves have a relative
phase difference (ϕBob − ϕEve) of pi and 0, respectively.
This implies that photons from the first (second) half of
the interfering pulses yield clicks in D1 (D0) determin-
istically. As the LLM localizes the detection efficiency
peak corresponding to the optical power peak, an arti-
ficial temporal displacement in the detector efficiencies
is induced. An inverse displacement can be obtained by
simply inverting the polarity of Eve’s phase modulation.
In the supplementary section [22], we describe a proof-
of-principle experiment to deceive the calibration routine.
With this setup, we record the temporal separation ∆01,
i.e. the difference between the delays for electronically
gating D0 and D1, for several runs of LLM. Relative to
the statistics from the normal runs (denoted by ∆noEve01 ),
the hacked runs yield an average shift, ∆Eve01 −∆
noEve
01 =
459 ps with a standard deviation of 105 ps. Figure 3
shows the detection efficiencies η0(t) and η1(t) (mea-
surement method explained in [22]) for the normal and
hacked cases. It also provides a quantitative comparison
between the usual and induced mismatch. Note that a
larger mismatch can be obtained by modifying the shape
of laser pulses coming from Bob.
After inducing this substantial efficiency mismatch,
Eve can use an intercept-resend strategy employing
‘faked states’ [12] to impose her will upon Bob (and Al-
ice). Compared to her intercepted measurements, she
prepares the opposite bit value in the opposite basis and
sends it with such a timing that the detection of the op-
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FIG. 3. Induced temporal mismatch: Efficiencies η0(t) (dot-
ted) and η1(t) (dashed) from normal LLMs, on the left, and
after Eve’s hack that induced a separation of 459 ps, on the
right. The logarithm of their ratio, quantifying the degree of
mismatch (solid line), is at least an order of magnitude higher
in the flanks after Eve’s hack: the dash-dot line indicates zero
mismatch. To eavesdrop successfully, Eve times the arrival of
“appropriately bright” faked states at t = t0 or t1 in Bob.
posite bit value is suppressed due to negligible detection
efficiency. As an example, assume that Eve measures bit
0 in the Z basis [in a phase-coded scheme, measuring in Z
(X) basis ⇔ applying ϕ = 0 (pi/2)]. Then, she resends
bit 1 in the X basis, timed to be detected at t = t0 (see
Fig. 3), where D1 is almost blind. Using the numerical
data on the induced mismatch, Eq. 3 from [16] yields a
QBER < 0.5% if the FSA is launched at times t0 and t1
where the efficiency mismatch is high.
However, it can be observed that the detection proba-
bilities for D0 and D1 are quite low in this case. A con-
siderable decrease in the rate of detection events in Bob
could ensue an alarm. Also, the (relatively increased)
dark counts would add significantly to the QBER. In fact,
Eve needs tomatch the channel transmission T that Alice
and Bob expect, without exceeding the QBER threshold
at which they abort key generation [17]. Experimentally,
we find that the abort threshold depends on the channel
loss seen by Clavis2; for an optical loss of 1–6 dB (corre-
sponding to 0.79> T > 0.25), it lies between 5.94–8.26%.
Eve solves these problems by increasing the mean
photon number of her faked states. To evaluate her
QBER, we elaborate the approach of [16] by general-
izing table I from this reference. Our attack strat-
egy, carefully accounting for all the involved factors,
is summarized in Table I. For instance, in the first
row we replace the probability of detection η0(t0)/2
by 1 − exp (−µ0η0(t0)/2) for a coherent-state pulse of
mean photon number µ0 impinging on Bob’s detectors
at time t0. Including the effect of the dark counts into
this expression, Bob’s probability to register 0 becomes
q0 = d0 + (1− d0) (1− exp (−µ0η0(t0)/2)), where d0 is
the dark count probability in detector D0. A row for
double clicks, i.e. simultaneous detection events in D0
and D1, is added for every (re-sent) state.
Due to the FSA, the D0/1 click probability at time t
no longer depends solely upon η0/1(t). Summing over all
the states sent by Alice (by extending Table I), the total
→Eve Eve→ Bob’s result Detection probability
Z, 0 X, 1, µ0, t0 0 q0 = d0 + (1− d0)×
(1− exp (−µ0η0(t0)/2))
1 q1 = d1 + (1− d1)×
(1− exp (−µ0η1(t0)/2))
0 ∩ 1 q0q1
loss 1− (q0 + q1 − q0q1)
X, 0 Z, 1, µ0, t0 0 r0 = d0
1 r1 = d1 + (1− d1)×
(1− exp (−µ0η1(t0)))
0 ∩ 1 r0r1
loss 1− (r0 + r1 − r0r1)
X, 1 Z, 0, µ1, t1 0 s0 = d0 + (1− d0)×
(1− exp (−µ1η0(t1)))
1 s1 = d1
0 ∩ 1 s0s1
loss 1− (s0 + s1 − s0s1)
TABLE I. Faked-state attack, given that Alice prepared bit
0 in the Z basis and that Bob measured in the Z basis (only
matching basis at Alice and Bob remains after sifting). The
first column contains the basis chosen by Eve and her mea-
surement result. The second column shows parameters of
the faked state resent by Eve: basis, bit, mean photon num-
ber, timing. The third column shows Bob’s measurement re-
sult; 0 ∩ 1 denotes a double click. The last column shows the
corresponding click probabilities (ignoring possible superlin-
earity effect in gated detectors [18]). Note: The first result
(→ Eve ≡ Z, 0) is twice as likely to occur as the other two.
detection probabilities in D0 and D1 when the attack is
launched at specific times t0 and t1 are
p0(µ0, µ1) = 0.75 + 0.25d− 0.25(1− d)×
(e−0.5µ0η00 + e−0.5µ1η01 + e−µ1η01) , (1)
p1(µ0, µ1) = 0.75 + 0.25d− 0.25(1− d)×
(e−0.5µ0η10 + e−0.5µ1η11 + e−µ0η10) . (2)
Here ηjk = ηj(tk) with j, k ∈ {0, 1} and d = mean (d0, d1)
are used to simplify the expressions. Similarly, one can
compute the expression for p0∩1, the total double-click
probability. Eve’s error probability, the arrival probabil-
ity of the optical signals in Bob, and the QBER are
perror(µ0, µ1) = 0.75 + 0.25d− 0.5p0∩1 − 0.125× (3)
(1 − d)
(
e−µ0η10 + 2e−0.5µ0η10 + e−µ1η01 + 2e−0.5µ1η01
)
,
parrive(µ0, µ1) = p0 + p1 − p0∩1 , (4)
QBER(µ0, µ1) = perror(µ0, µ1)/parrive(µ0, µ1) . (5)
Here double clicks are assumed to be assigned a random
bit value by Bob [25], causing an error in half the cases.
If Alice and Bob are connected back-to-back (channel
transmission T ≈ 1), the click probabilities in Bob should
be slightly less than half of the peak values in Fig. 3. This
is owing to optical losses (>∼ 3 dB) in Bob’s apparatus.
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FIG. 4. Minimum QBER versus click probabilities in D0
and D1: Eve minimizes the error with a suitable choice of
the mean photon number of the faked states (for this plot,
1 < µ0 < 100 and 21 < µ1 < 120 at Bob’s detectors). The
thick shaded line indicates Bob’s detection probabilities. The
QBER introduced by Eve stays below 7% for T >
∼
0.25.
Eve’s constraints can now be formalized as: starting in
the vicinity of p0 = 0.038 and p1 = 0.032, not only does
she have to match Bob’s expected detection rate for any
given T < 1, but also keep the resultant QBER below the
threshold at which Clavis2 aborts the key exchange. We
assume Eve detects photons at Alice’s exit using a perfect
apparatus, and resends perfectly aligned faked states.
Substituting t1 = −1.32 ns, t0 = 1.90 ns (marked in
Fig. 3) and d = 2.4 × 10−4 in Eqns. 1–5, Eve collects
tuples [p0, p1, QBER] by varying µ0 and µ1 in a suitable
range. Out of all tuples that feature the same detection
probabilities (arising from different combinations of µ0
and µ1), Eve chooses the one having the lowest QBER.
A contour plot in Fig. 4 displays this minimized error
minµ0,µ1 QBER((µ0, µ1)| (p0, p1)). The thick shaded line
shows that for T > 0.25, Eve not only maintains the
detection rates within 5% of Bob’s expected values, but
also keeps the QBER below 7% [? ]; thus breaking the
security of the system. Note that the simulation assumes
a lossless Eve, but in principle she can cover loss from
her realistic detection apparatus by increasing µ0 and µ1
further and/or including t0 and t1 in the minimization.
To counter this hack, Bob should randomly apply a
phase of 0 or pi (instead of pi/2 uniformly) while perform-
ing LLM. This modification is implementable in software
and has already been proposed to ID Quantique. More
generally, a method to shield QKD systems from attacks
that exploit DEM is described in Ref. [23].
In conclusion, we report a proof-of-principle experi-
ment to induce a large detector efficiency mismatch in
a commercial QKD system by deceiving a vital calibra-
tion routine. An optimized faked-state attack on such a
compromised system would not alarm Alice and Bob as
it would introduce a QBER < 7% for a large range of
expected channel transmissions. Thus, the overall secu-
rity of the system is broken. With initiatives for stan-
dardizing QKD [24] underway, we believe this report is
timely and shall facilitate elevating the security of prac-
tical QKD systems.
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FIG. 5. Eve’s implementation (mAlice) by modifying Alice’s module: The onboard pulser driving the phase modulator (PM)
is disconnected, and the PM itself is positioned before the 23.5 km delay loops (DLs). The trigger conditioner circuit allows
(prevents) the pulse & delay generator to be triggered by the short arm (long arm) optical pulses. Newly added components
to the original Alice module are labeled in italic. VOA: variable optical attenuator, FM: Faraday mirror.
Implementation of the hack: Here, we explain our experimental implementation of the scheme outlined in the
Letter for deceiving Line Length Measurement (LLM), the calibration routine of the Clavis2 QKD system [15]. For
this purpose, we rig the module of Alice as shown in Fig. 5. From now on, we call this manipulated device mAlice. An
electronic tap placed on the classical detector (normally used by Alice for measuring the incoming optical power [5])
is conditioned appropriately with a homemade circuit. The output of this circuit provides the trigger for the pulse &
delay generator (PDG, Highland Technology P400), which essentially drives the phase modulator (PM) in mAlice.
For experimental convenience, we also change the settings in the Clavis2 firmware (Bob’s EEPROM specifically)
such that during the execution of LLM, ϕBob = 0 is applied instead of the usual pi/2. This relaxes the requirement on
Eve’s modulation pattern: in comparison to the waveform in Fig. 2(b) in the Letter, the PDG needs to switch simply
from 0 to Vpi through the center of the optical pulse. This is in principle equivalent to the scheme in Fig. 2(b) in the
Letter, while easier to implement. In other words, it does not affect a full implementation of Eve. Normally, Alice
applies the phase modulation in a double pass by making use of the Faraday mirror. However, the PM in mAlice is
shifted closer to Alice’s entrance (i.e. before the delay loops) to enable a precise synchronization of the PDG. To ensure
that the photons passing through the PM (in a single pass now) pick up the requisite ‘pi’ modulation, a polarization
controller is deployed before the PM.
Finally, the synchronization of the rising edge of Eve’s modulation to the center of the optical pulse is performed by
scanning the delay in the PDG (in steps of 5 ps) while monitoring the interference visibility [15]. As Eve’s modulation
flips the phase of the optical pulse through the center, the visibility reduces to zero. The corresponding delay setting
of the PDG can then be used to induce the temporal efficiency mismatch between Bob’s detectors D0 and D1, during
the execution of LLM.
We emphasize that the mAlice module serves as a proof-of-principle implementation only for inducing the detector
efficiency mismatch during the LLM. It should not be confused with Eve’s intercept or resend modules, needed in
the subsequent faked-state attack. Finally, note that Eve is free to modify Bob’s pulses or replace them by her
suitably-prepared pulses, and thus effectively control the amount of detection efficiency mismatch that can be induced.
Measurement of efficiency curves: Detection efficiencies η0(t) and η1(t) are estimated at single-photon level by
scanning the detector gates in steps of 20 ps with an external laser (optical pulse-width ∼ 200 ps). We average the
click probability per gate and subtract d0/1 (the dark count rate in D0/1) from it. This gives a more accurate estimate
of the efficiencies, especially in the flanks (see Fig. 3 in the Letter).
